Like all probabilistic decisions, recognition memory judgments are based on inferences about the strength and quality of stimulus familiarity. In recent articles, B. W. A. Whittlesea and J. Leboe (2000; J. Leboe & B. W. A. Whittlesea, 2002) proposed that such memory decisions entail various heuristics, similar to well-known heuristics in overt decision making. Using verbal stimulus materials, Whittlesea and Leboe illustrated 3 separate memory heuristics: fluency, generation, and resemblance. In the present investigation, the authors examined the generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition. In 12 experiments, people memorized faces and later performed exclusion (source memory) tasks. Every experiment contained natural groups of facial photographs (e.g., Caucasian vs. Asian faces), but such groups were not always valid source-memory predictors. Instead, across experiments, the potential utility of generation and resemblance strategies was systematically varied. People were quite sensitive to such variations, changing from one heuristic to another as needed. However, they also combined heuristics, both improving and damaging performance across conditions. The relevance of recognition decision heuristics to eyewitness memory is considered.
Imagine that you are watching a movie with friends and a vaguely familiar actor appears on screen. Everyone "knows him from somewhere," but recalling the past movie or show is difficult. Eventually, someone recalls a prior source, perhaps a commercial, and the tension is instantly relieved. Or perhaps someone questions this recollection ("No, that doesn't seem right. . ."). This is a situation that nearly everyone has experienced. The converse, less common situation is eyewitness identification during a lineup. In the actor example, a person seems familiar, but feelings of true recognition require the retrieval of prior context. For an eyewitness, context is stipulated: Feelings of true recognition require a person who closely matches the prior memory. However, in either case, recognition is not a direct product of memory trace activation; people must evaluate the degree of fit between their past and present states of mind. In either case, similarity from one person to another can elicit false recognition.
In such cases of person perception, how might people decide when true recognition has been achieved? Recently, Whittlesea and Leboe (2000; Whittlesea & Williams, 2001a , 2001b proposed that people use various memory decision heuristics in recognition.
Their ideas were framed in Whittlesea's (1997) Selective Construction and Preservation of Experiences (SCAPE) theory, which shares underlying principles with prior dual-process theories of memory (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981 ; C. M. Mandler, 1980 Mandler, , 1991 Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996 ; see also Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997) . In turn, dual-process theories of memory (often recognition memory) share common ground with dual-process theories of judgment and reasoning (Gilbert, 2002; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000; see Kahneman, 2003) . Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) noted that remembering requires a person to decide that information in his or her current thinking derives from a source in the past. This is a necessarily inferential process, subject to heuristics similar to those in decision making. Whittlesea and Leboe described three heuristics that affect the recollection-decision process: generation, resemblance, and fluency.
The generation heuristic is based on retrieval of episodic details and mentally placing stimuli in their prior contexts. In the foregoing example, until the actor's prior role is recalled, his familiarity leaves a nagging, incomplete feeling of memory. When contextual details are more easily retrieved, people feel more confident about memory-fluent contextual generation is a heuristic signal of true memory. The resemblance heuristic uses the fit between a stimulus under consideration and relevant prior experiences, as when people falsely recognize words or faces that are consistent with a prototype (Roediger & McDermott, 1995 Homa, Smith, Macak, Johovich, & Osorio, 2001) or details consistent with a car accident (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) . Note that generation and resemblance are somewhat similar and may co-occur in behavior (Kahneman, 2003) : A person may seem familiar because of resemblance, then be "validated" by fluent generation. For example, a professor sees a vaguely familiar, college-aged person working at a restaurant. The person may look like many students or may closely resemble a particular student from a prior term. Bothered by unresolved familiarity, the professor may search memory, retrieving that prior class as a likely context. If the prior class easily comes to mind, a sense of true recognition will arise.
Among the heuristics, fluency is best known, having been studied in depth (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990) . In this heuristic, the fluency (ease) of perceptual processing is used as a cue to stimulus familiarity (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dwyan, 1989) . According to Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) , fluency feels like familiarity only under certain conditions: When a stimulus is perceived with unexpected ease (e.g., a single high-contrast word in a relatively low-contrast list), that relative fluency triggers a feeling of familiarity. Thus, the underlying account of fluency is quite similar to generation. In both, the efficient production of mental states conveys a sense of prior experience. Many data suggest that perceptual processing is enhanced when target stimuli are more familiar (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Logan & Etherton, 1994) . People implicitly assume this relation between processing efficiency and familiarity, so fluency manipulations can elicit memory illusions. That is, when perception of novel stimuli is extrinsically enhanced, inappropriate feelings of familiarity can arise, leading to false alarms (Goldinger, Kleider, & Shelley, 1999; Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Whittlesea et al., 1990) .
Flexible Heuristic Selection
In a general sense, one may consider heuristic influences on recognition memory (or decision making) in terms of cue utilization, bearing in mind that cues naturally vary in validity across situations. In cognitive science, heuristic processing often denotes a failure of rationality, as some relatively nondiagnostic cue (e.g., a stereotype, hindsight bias) is favored over more valid potential cues (e.g., base rates). However, as Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999) emphasized, people often arrive at perfectly sound decisions by placing faith in one or two cues. Given the limits of human performance and the typical limits of available information, people cannot often derive averages of many cues, each weighted according to validity (e.g., Brunswik, 1943) . Instead, people typically rely on small sets of (one hopes, relevant) cues. Balancing accuracy and efficiency, skilled decision makers change their heuristics across situations, tracking cue validities and choosing the best. Of course, for decisions of momentous importance, they may combine cues in a more algorithmic manner. In the present research, we systematically varied the parameters of recognition memory tests, encouraging participants toward different utilization of statistical cues.
Given the different hypothesized bases for recognition decisions, different heuristics (or cues) may assume priority in different situations. Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) suggested that heuristic selection is neither automatic nor stimulus driven. Instead, it depends on the particular test demands, which cause people to interpret their experiences of stimuli in idiosyncratic ways. This suggests people may be induced to use different heuristics via manipulations of test procedures. To test this idea, Whittlesea and Leboe conducted experiments manipulating both perceptual fluency and structural relations between study and test items. The stimuli were pronounceable nonsense words (e.g., BARDEN). The prototype memory set was structured such that each item had a D or B in its fourth position. From each prototype, the authors generated four test items, two following the rule (legal), and two violating the rule (illegal). To manipulate fluency, the authors structured the experiment so that half the test items contained glide transitions between the third and fourth letters and half contained stops (e.g., BALDEN vs. BACDEN). People were faster naming the items with glide transitions.
To encourage different strategies, the authors manipulated the training items and test procedures. In three experiments, people first judged legality of test items, on the basis of the structural rule (which they had to discover for themselves). Conformity to the rule yields natural sets of items, providing a basis for later resemblance use. In one experiment, all training items included glide transitions. In another, all training items were nonglides. In the third, half contained glides and half did not. After classification training, participants received recognition memory tests. By rotating stimuli through these conditions, Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) made the fluency and resemblance heuristics either cooperate or compete. They found that people readily adopted the optimal strategy, depending on the structure of the recognition tests.
Heuristics in Face Recognition
With respect to testing memory heuristics, such as fluency, most researchers have used verbal materials. Recently, Kleider and Goldinger (2004) tested perceptual fluency effects in face recognition. It has been suggested that faces are processed in a relatively holistic fashion (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998) . Although people can rehearse faces by elaboration (e.g., "Paul was the guy with shifty eyes. . ."), this is not a common behavior (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987) . In fact, most "improve your memory" books specifically train readers to adopt this habit when meeting new people (e.g., Lorayne & Lucas, 1996) . Instead, people mainly rely on face familiarity, which makes face recognition especially susceptible to heuristics (see Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982) . In several experiments, participants saw clear study faces, followed by clear and noise-obscured faces in a recognition test. Consistent with the fluency heuristic, an "old" bias emerged to clear faces, particularly increasing false alarms. In the present research, we test the generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition. (As we note later, some recognition decisions were likely affected by fluency as well. However, we made no efforts to manipulate fluency in our experiments, leaving its likely contribution fairly constant.)
If reliance on memory heuristics is prevalent in face recognition, it will be a matter of considerable practical importance. As an obvious example, eyewitness decisions based on the resemblance heuristic can have disastrous consequences. Indeed, many police districts have changed their lineup identification procedures, switching from simultaneous presentation of all people to sequential presentation (Smalley, 2004) . This change was motivated by research showing that, given simultaneous lineups, people tend to use resemblance, selecting the person who best matches their memory rather than making finer discriminations based on recollection of specific details (Wells et al., 1998 (Wells et al., , 2000 . Ample evidence suggests that cross-race face discrimination is relatively poor (e.g., O'Toole, Deffenbacher, Valentin, & Abdi, 1994) , suggesting that cross-race recognition may involve considerable reliance on the resemblance heuristic.
As noted earlier, in eyewitness memory (e.g., lineup selection), the context of original face encoding is typically stipulated. Thus, relative to resemblance, the generation heuristic likely has little effect on eyewitness performance. However, contexts are not always perfect cues: Situations are conceivable wherein generation could affect eyewitness decisions. For example, imagine that, following an unexpected championship, college basketball fans celebrate in the streets. Among hundreds of people, most are exuberant but well behaved. Others form unruly mobs, starting fights and destroying property. The police arrive, keeping nearly everyone in the general area. However, with everyone standing around, the police cannot discriminate the rioters from the bystanders. They seek help from a witness, who presumably encoded people to different degrees, on the basis of variations in attention. In essence, she must generate the proper subcontext for each individual, asking herself, "Do I remember this person from the mob or from the background?"
In this situation, the generation of prior context is critical; its fluency will likely affect both decisions and confidence. Given a relatively homogenous crowd (without obvious variations in perceptual fluency across individuals), the witness has little other recourse. Nevertheless, this form of laborious recall seems consistent with an ideal witness, a person who responds positively only when a familiar person is convincingly placed in a specific prior context. Although such memory is inferential, it may represent the best case scenario for eyewitness recall. Alternatively, perhaps the rioters all share certain characteristics (e.g., young men, certain style of dress). Now, the witness may become inadvertently lazy, recalling contexts for some people, trusting resemblance for others. We model this situation, albeit in far less dramatic form, in the present research.
In this article, we report 12 face-recognition experiments, all testing the conditions that encourage people to either adopt a resemblance strategy or attempt recollection (generation) of specific details.
1 Our approach was motivated by the covert nature of generation. As we show later, when people apply the resemblance heuristic, our method produces a clear, characteristic profile. By contrast, there is no obvious empirical signature that signals decisions based on more or less fluent contextual generation. We therefore combined manipulations (some intended to enhance resemblance, others to enhance generation), always using the strength of a resemblance profile as our means to infer underlying processes. When we occasionally state that participants used a generation strategy, we are referring specifically to the absence of a resemblance profile. In our terminology, generation denotes the laborious recollection of faces and contexts. In keeping with Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) , the generation heuristic denotes a situation wherein people bias recognition decisions on the basis of the relative fluency of generation, and resemblance refers to a heuristic strategy wherein recognition decisions are biased by a test item's thematic similarity to other studied items.
Experiments 1-3: Photographic Backgrounds
To simulate the foregoing situation in schematic form, we used Jacoby's (1991; Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989 ) exclusion task, a source-monitoring task that is part of the larger processdissociation framework. Our goal was to contrast conditions allowing only generation (i.e., effortful recollection) with conditions that also allowed resemblance. In Experiments 1-3, we accomplished this by randomizing or grouping faces, on the basis of photographic backgrounds. We took photographs of 100 young men, half standing against a smooth white backdrop, the other half against a textured stucco wall (see Figure 1) . We presented these photos to volunteers in different ways. In all conditions, first people tried to memorize a set of photos (Group 1). After a break, they tried to memorize a second set (Group 2). After another break, they received a recognition test with exclusion instructions: They were to respond old only to Group 1 photos, responding new to both Group 2 photos and completely new photos. The new photos contained equal numbers of white and stucco backgrounds.
To encourage different approaches, in each experiment we included two conditions: In random conditions, both backgrounds were used equally in Group 1 and Group 2. Thus, the photo groups were arbitrary, defined only by temporal context, which precluded the use of resemblance. In systematic conditions, all Group 1 photos had white backgrounds, and Group 2 photos had stucco backgrounds. Thus, participants could use backgrounds as a cue to group membership, with only half of the new photos remaining as a challenge. That is, all stucco-background photos could be easily 1 In this article, we apply the term face recognition in an experimentally constrained manner. That is, we intend a situation wherein people view novel faces at study and later discriminate those faces (identical photographs) from foils in a recognition test. Thus, face recognition refers to an experimental task rather than person memory. When focusing on memory for specific people, researchers may present slightly different photographs of the same people across study and test. classified as new, which left participants to discriminate old from new white-background photos. This could be achieved by a combination of recollection and raw familiarity (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) and could be affected by perceptual fluency of repeated faces. For our purposes, the crucial point is that a resemblance strategy would be evident from a specific pattern of false alarms, described in tandem with the results. In the service of clarity and brevity, we present Experiments 1-3 together. The only differences across experiments involved depth of processing (i.e., level of processing; LOP) during initial face encoding. In Experiment 1, people merely looked at each face. In Experiment 2, each face was paired with a personality descriptor for participants to consider. In Experiment 3, these descriptors were again presented, and participants were asked to internally generate another for each photo. We expected that performance would improve and that people would rely less on the resemblance heuristic following deeper encoding.
Method: Experiments 1-3
Participants. In Experiment 1, 119 Arizona State University students participated for course credit; Experiments 2 and 3 included 112 and 96 students, respectively. When we collapsed across experiments, there were 327 participants, with 164 and 163 people in the random and systematic conditions, respectively.
Materials. All the experiments used a common pool of 100 black-andwhite photographs of young men. All were head-and-shoulder (mug shot) style, taken against one of two backgrounds. Half of the men were photographed before a white wall and half before a textured stucco wall. All photographs were digitized and equated for size and contrast in Adobe Photoshop.
Design. Each experiment included two between-subjects conditions, defined by photo backgrounds at study. In systematic conditions, backgrounds were correlated with group membership: Group 1 photos had white backgrounds, and Group 2 photos had stucco backgrounds. In random conditions, both groups included both backgrounds equally. Within these conditions, recognition test photos were of four types. Test photos were either targets (old, Group 1), familiar foils (old, Group 2), new consistent (white), or new inconsistent (stucco). The labels consistent and inconsistent refer specifically to the systematic conditions, wherein false alarms to white-background photos would be consistent with a resemblance strategy. For convenience, we also use these terms when presenting results for the random conditions, but they should not be literally interpreted.
Procedure. Participants were tested in groups of 4 -8 students. Each person sat in a partitioned booth equipped with a Dell computer. Each session occurred in three parts, beginning with presentation of 40 Group 1 photos, followed by a distractor task and then presentation of 40 Group 2 photos. For the distractor task, participants rapidly discriminated numbers and letters for 3 min. After the Group 2 photos, they completed the distractor task a second time, followed by the recognition test. In Experiment 1, during study, each photo was shown individually for 2 s, filling the screen vertically. Between each photo, a sentence (Prepare for the next picture.) was shown for 1 s. These procedures were similar in Experiment 2, with one change: Each photograph was paired with a random personality descriptor (e.g., friendly). People were asked to consider whether the descriptor seemed to match the person, then press a key for the next photo. Experiment 3 was the same, but participants were also asked to silently generate another descriptor that seemed appropriate to each photo.
In systematic conditions, all Group 1 photos had white backgrounds, and Group 2 photos had stucco backgrounds. In random conditions, both groups had an equal mix of both backgrounds. During the recognition tests (which included the same backgrounds), participants in all conditions saw, in random order, 20 Group 1 photos, 20 Group 2 photos, and 20 new photos (half white, half stucco). Participants were instructed to respond old (via keypress) only to Group 1 photos, responding new to all others. Note that perfect performance required the participant to respond new in two thirds of the trials. Test photos were shown for 2 s each, but people had 5 s to respond.
Results: Experiments 1-3
We conducted data analyses in a similar manner for all experiments, focusing mainly on absolute hit and false alarm rates. Hits were defined as correct old responses to Group 1 photos. False alarms were classified into three types: The Group 2 false alarm (G2FA) rate indicated the frequency of incorrect old responses to Group 2 (inappropriately familiar) photos. Among the new photos, the consistent false alarm (ConFA) rate indicated the frequency of incorrect old responses to new, white-background photos. The inconsistent false alarm (IncFA) rate indicated the frequency of incorrect old responses to new, stucco-background photos. (Note again that the latter terms were defined relative to the systematic conditions. For random conditions, they denote the white and stucco photographs but have no deeper meaning.) We conducted signal-detection analyses for all experiments. However, because each condition produced one hit rate and three false alarm rates, these analyses were redundant with analyses of variance (ANOVAs) conducted on the false alarms. Thus, we mention them only occasionally. In all statistical tests, we adopted a conservative significance criterion ( p Ͻ .01); we only report occasional significance values that fell short of this cutoff.
LOP effects. Although Experiments 1-3 were distinguished by differences in encoding tasks, the LOP manipulation had little impact. In the random conditions, a main effect of LOP emerged in hit rates, F(2, 162) ϭ 16.0, MSE ϭ 3.66, partial 2 ( p 2 ) ϭ .07, which rose by 12% across experiments. We observed another main effect in G2FA rates, F(2, 162) ϭ 11.8, MSE ϭ 3.19, p 2 ϭ .05, which rose by 11% across experiments. Conversely, average false alarm rates to new photos (ConFA and IncFA combined) fell by a marginal 3% across experiments, F(2, 162) ϭ 2.1, MSE ϭ 3.29, p ϭ .07. Thus, deeper encoding marginally improved hits and false alarms to novel photos but also had the ironic effect of increasing familiarity and, thus, false alarms to Group 2 photos. In systematic conditions, hit rates slightly increased (by 6%) with deeper LOPs, F(2, 161) ϭ 5.2, MSE ϭ 3.02, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .03. However, no LOP effects emerged among the G2FA, ConFA, or IncFA rates. We further consider LOP effects in later experiments and the General Discussion.
Combined results. Because we observed similar results across Experiments 1-3, we show their combined results in Figure 2 . In random conditions, photo backgrounds were nondiagnostic, so we expected no evidence of the resemblance heuristic. As suggested by the gray bars in Figure 2 , this was a fairly difficult task, but performance was well above chance, with a hit rate of 72% and all false alarm rates below 50%. Of primary importance, the different false alarm rates followed an expected pattern: The G2FA rate (43%) was reliably higher than the averaged ConFA (17%) and IncFA (20%) rates, F(1, 163) ϭ 49.9, MSE ϭ 2.35, p 2 ϭ .48. These latter false alarm rates differed, F(1, 163) ϭ 5.2, MSE ϭ 3.11, p 2 ϭ .04, in a direction opposite to that expected in the systematic conditions. In systematic conditions (black bars in Figure 2 ), photographic backgrounds predicted group membership, giving participants an opportunity to use the resemblance heuristic. Comparisons across false alarm rates showed that people did rely on background cues: The G2FA rate (29%), which was the highest false alarm rate in the random condition, was statistically equivalent to the ConFA rate (28%) in the systematic condition, F(1, 162) ϭ 0.8, ns. The ConFA rate was double the IncFA rate (14%), F(1, 162) ϭ 42.8, MSE ϭ 2.65, p 2 ϭ .39, verifying that participants treated new photos differently depending on backgrounds.
Comparing the random and systematic conditions also suggested different strategies. By virtue of the diagnostic background cues, hit rates were 12% higher in the systematic condition, F(1, 326) ϭ 31.8, MSE ϭ 2.50, p 2 ϭ .18. In similar fashion, G2FA rates were 14% higher in the random condition, F(1, 326) ϭ 35.1, MSE ϭ 2.78, p 2 ϭ .19. Finally, we contrasted the ConFA and IncFA rates in a 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA, finding a reliable Background ϫ Condition interaction, F(1, 326) ϭ 43.4, MSE ϭ 3.26, p 2 ϭ .21, which again verified that participants in the random and systematic conditions treated new photos differently depending on backgrounds.
Discussion: Experiments 1-3
Experiments 1-3 all produced qualitatively similar patterns, with relatively modest LOP effects. Performance in the random conditions attested to the general task difficulty, especially the source-memory discrimination of Group 1 and 2 photos. In signaldetection analyses, sensitivity (dЈ) scores based on hits and G2FAs never exceeded 1.0 in the random conditions. False alarms were considerably lower to new photos, with sensitivity ranging from 1.7 to 2.6. More important, when we compared false alarm rates to photos with white and stucco backgrounds, there were no appreciable differences in either sensitivity or bias.
Response patterns differed in the random and systematic conditions, with changes in the systematic conditions indicating use of the resemblance heuristic. By this heuristic, a simple strategy to restrict old answers to white-background photos would create a specific profile: high hit rates, low G2FA rates, high ConFA rates, and low IncFA rates. Indeed, total application of the heuristic would drive these respective rates to 100%, 0%, 100%, and 0%. Although our observed patterns did not approach such extremes, all changes followed their expected directions (see Figure 2 ). Relative to random conditions, average hit rates in systematic conditions increased by 11.9%, average G2FA rates fell by 13.7%, average ConFA rates increased by 11.2%, and average IncFA rates decreased by 6.3%. All these differences were consistent with application of the resemblance heuristic.
Although the results of Experiments 1-3 followed their expected pattern, the changes were smaller in magnitude than we anticipated. On closer examination of data from the systematic conditions, we discovered large differences across individual participants-some clearly adopted the resemblance rule, but others behaved as if the photo backgrounds were still random. To test this observation more formally, we applied a simple, blind algorithm: In all three systematic conditions, we sorted participants into rule user and nonuser groups, entirely on the basis of their relative ConFA and IncFA rates. That is, we designated any participant a rule user if his or her ConFA and IncFA rates expressed at least a 4:1 ratio. The results are shown in Table 1 . Although we conducted statistical analyses on these data, visual inspection of response patterns is sufficient and involves fewer questionable assumptions.
Three interesting results are shown in Table 1 . First, when we ignored the ConFA and IncFA rates (which we hand picked to separate groups), clear differences emerged in the measures that remained free to vary. As the resemblance heuristic predicts, hit rates were approximately 12% higher among rule users. The difference in G2FA rates was more dramatic, with rule users averaging 36% fewer errors than nonusers. These results seem to verify that different subgroups emerged in systematic conditions, with some people using resemblance and others behaving identically to participants in the random condition. The second interesting result concerns the numbers of people falling into each subgroup across experiments: As the encoding LOP became deeper, smaller proportions of people followed the superficial rule. In similar fashion, the third interesting result concerns the apparent degrees of adhesion to the rule across experiments: As the encoding LOP became deeper, rule users committed more G2FA errors. These latter observations both suggest that, when true familiarity of Group 2 photos was increased, people became increasingly reluctant to reject foils on the basis of a superficial rule.
Experiments 4 -10: Caucasian and Japanese Faces
Although the subgroup results from Experiments 1-3 invite interesting speculation, they are also worrisome. In particular, whereas the existence of different subgroups is clear, the reason for their existence is not. People may choose different response strategies for various psychologically interesting reasons. Alternatively, some people might have simply failed to notice variations in the photo backgrounds. This seems plausible, especially in consideration of the LOP manipulation: When encoding tasks require deeper processing of the faces, it seems likely that fewer Figure 2 . Combined results of Experiments 1-3. Mean hit rates and separate false alarm rates (plus or minus standard error of measurement) are shown for the random conditions (gray bars) and systematic conditions (black bars). Note that consistent and inconsistent false alarms do not logically apply to the random conditions. These are better considered as false alarm (white) and false alarm (stucco). G2FAs ϭ Group 2 false alarms; ConFAs ϭ consistent false alarms; IncFAs ϭ inconsistent false alarms.
people would discover systematic changes in background. If so, although the systematic conditions of Experiments 1-3 show a shift toward resemblance use, the strength of this shift might have been systematically diminished.
Given this concern, Experiments 4 -10 share some design features with Experiments 1-3, but we used grouping information that was more salient than photographic backgrounds. In particular, we presented photographs of men and women, half Caucasian and half Japanese (from Ekman & Matsumoto, 1993) . We used these photos in all remaining experiments: All photos were head-andshoulder shots, with people showing neutral facial expressions. All depicted people were shown on a uniform background, wearing identical blue shirts.
In Experiments 4 -10, we again manipulated LOP during encoding. However, separate experiments were not defined by different LOPs. Instead, each experiment contained two betweengroups LOP conditions. In shallow encoding, participants merely looked at each photo for memorization. In deeper encoding, participants rated each depicted person for attractiveness, using a 7-point scale. The differences across Experiments 4 -10 mainly concern group compositions. Experiment 4 was analogous to the random conditions of prior experiments: Participants saw 18 faces in Group 1, then 18 faces in Group 2. In both groups, we used Japanese and Caucasian faces equally. The test phase followed the earlier design, requiring old responses to Group 1 photos and new responses to both Group 2 and truly new photos. The new photos presented an equal mix of Japanese and Caucasian faces.
Experiment 5 was analogous to the prior systematic conditions: Group 1 presented 18 Caucasian faces, and Group 2 presented 18 Japanese faces, strongly encouraging a resemblance strategy. Experiment 6 was nearly identical to Experiment 5 but presented a role reversal: Now, Japanese faces were presented in Group 1 and Caucasian faces in Group 2. This was motivated by the results of Experiment 5 and by prior findings in cross-race face memory (e.g., O'Toole et al., 1994) .
In Experiment 7, we reduced the cue validity of race: Group 1 consisted of 14 Caucasian faces and 4 Japanese faces (78% Caucasian), and Group 2 had a complementary mix of 14 Japanese and 4 Caucasian faces. We intended this change to investigate the spontaneous formation of subgroups, as we previously observed.
We expected that, once the predictive value of race was diminished, some participants would abandon the resemblance strategy in favor of a more vigilant recollection-generation strategy. Experiment 8 presented the same proportions, but roles were reversed, with the primarily Japanese photo set presented first.
In Experiments 9 and 10, we slightly increased cue validity, relative to Experiments 7 and 8. In Experiment 9, Group 1 consisted of 16 Caucasian and 2 Japanese faces (89% Caucasian); Group 2 had a complementary mix of 16 Japanese and 2 Caucasian faces. Finally, Experiment 10 used the same proportions, but we again reversed roles, with the primarily Japanese photo set presented as Group 1. Again, for both brevity and clarity, we present Experiments 4 -10 together, with brief motivations for each experiment explained between results.
Method: Experiments 4 -10
Participants. In all experiments, participants were introductory psychology students at Arizona State University, participating for course credit. Experiment 4 included 78 students (40 and 38 in the shallow and deep encoding conditions, respectively). In similar fashion, Experiment 5 included 87 students (46 shallow, 41 deep), Experiment 6 included 78 students (39 shallow, 39 deep), Experiment 7 included 80 students (47 shallow, 33 deep), Experiment 8 included 79 students (39 shallow, 40 deep), Experiment 9 included 80 students (40 shallow, 40 deep), and Experiment 10 included 78 students (40 shallow, 38 deep). These experiments were all conducted online, with remarkable cooperation from the volunteers: Across Experiments 4 -10, only 7 participants were dropped because of noncompliance with experimental instructions. Although we did not collect demographic data from these participants, the undergraduate population at Arizona State includes approximately 70% Caucasian and 5% Asian students.
Materials. All the experiments used a common pool of 54 color photographs of young men and women, all from the Ekman and Matsumoto (1993) Japanese and Caucasian Neutral Faces set. Each photograph was converted to Windows bitmap format and was set to screen dimensions of 640 ϫ 455.
Design. All experiments included two conditions contrasting LOP during study, tested between subjects. Subject to variations in group composition (as listed earlier), all experiments had a similar design: Eighteen photos were studied in Group 1, followed by 18 in Group 2. During recognition tests, all 36 photos were presented, along with 18 new photos Note. All values are percentages. Groups membership was determined by a simple algorithm: Participants were designated rule users when their consistent false alarm (ConFA) rates exceeded their inconsistent false alarm (IncFA) rates by at least 4:1. Hit and Group 2 false alarm (G2FA) rates were left free to vary.
(half Japanese, half Caucasian). As before, participants were required to respond old to Group 1 photos and new to all others. Procedure. To participate, students logged onto an experiment administration system and followed a hyperlink to a dedicated server. Once a student indicated consent to participate, the server transferred all photos and experimental control routines to a temporary directory on the participant's computer; these files were removed on experiment completion. Each session occurred in three parts, beginning with presentation of 18 Group 1 photos, followed by a distractor task and then presentation of 18 Group 2 photos. For the distractor task, participants answered five amusing opinion questions. After the Group 2 photos, a similar distractor task was presented, followed by the recognition test. In shallow LOP conditions, each photo was shown for 4 s, with asterisks (****) appearing between successive photos. In deep LOP conditions, participants were shown a 7-point Likert scale beneath each photo and rated the depicted person's attractiveness by clicking on a number. They had 3 s to respond; after they entered the rating, the computer waited 1 s before continuing to the next photo.
During the recognition tests, participants in all conditions saw, in random order, 18 Group 1 photos, 18 Group 2 photos, and 18 new photos (half Japanese, half Caucasian). Participants were instructed to respond old (via keypress) only to Group 1 photos, responding new to all others. Note that perfect performance required the participant to respond new in two thirds of the trials. Test photos were shown for 3 s each, but people had 5 s to respond.
Results and Discussion: Experiments 4 -10
The detailed results for Experiments 4 -10 are shown in Table 2 . To allow easier appreciation of key results, in Figure 3 we also show the results, collapsed across LOPs. As before, please note that ConFA and IncFA do not logically apply to Experiment 4 (akin to earlier random conditions) but are used to facilitate comparisons across other experiments. We first consider patterns within experiments, followed by patterns across experiments. However, with so many experiments presented en masse, it would be unreasonable to report all cross-experiment statistical comparisons. We thus focus on selected, relevant contrasts.
Experiment 4. In Experiment 4, Japanese and Caucasian photos were evenly mixed in both Groups 1 and 2, so we anticipated no evidence for resemblance use. When one compares the upper rows of Table 2 , it is immediately apparent that LOP had no reliable effects, all Fs(1, 69) Ͻ 2.0, ns. We therefore collapsed across LOPs for later analyses (see Figure 3, Experiment 6. In Experiment 6, we repeated Experiment 5, with one simple change; people saw Japanese faces in Group 1 and were thus required to later classify those faces as old. This change was motivated by an aspect of Experiment 5: Participants clearly used the resemblance heuristic, with ConFA rates exceeding G2FA and IncFA rates. Nevertheless, those ConFA rates were fairly low, averaging 23%, whereas strict adherence to resemblance would push the rates up toward 100%. By virtue of our experimental design, participants in Experiment 5 could essentially ignore Japanese faces, which all required new responses. Thus, the main challenge would be to discriminate the 18 Group 1 faces from 9 Caucasian foils. Participants managed this reasonably well (dЈ ϭ 1.68), likely using some combination of recollection and familiarity-based guessing.
By assigning Japanese faces to the primary role, we challenged participants with a more difficult, cross-race discrimination task (Byatt & Rhodes, 2004; O'Toole et al., 1994) . Now, whereas Caucasian faces allowed constant new responses, Japanese faces required separation into old and new categories. As shown in Table  2 (also Figure 3 , Panel C), this role reversal had a dramatic impact. Within Experiment 6, responses again followed a clear resemblance pattern, with average G2FA rates 55% lower than ConFA rates, F(1, 77) ϭ 126.2, MSE ϭ 1.01, p 2 ϭ .55. In turn, ConFA rates were 61% higher than IncFA rates, F(1, 77) ϭ 332.5, MSE ϭ 0.92, p 2 ϭ .79. Another change concerns LOP effects. Although no LOP effects emerged for either G2FAs or IncFAs (which produced results near ceiling), the deeper LOP increased hits by 4.4%, F(1, 76) ϭ 5.9, MSE ϭ 2.79, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .04, and decreased G2FAs by 5.8%, F(1, 76) ϭ 8.1, MSE ϭ 2.90, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .05. Although these effects were modest, they show that people benefited from deeper study when discriminations were more challenging, as we might expect when people rely more on recollection.
When one compares Experiments 5 and 6, stark differences are again evident. As noted, in Experiment 5, hit rates were considerably higher than ConFA rates (dЈ ϭ 1.68). In Experiment 6, when participants had to discriminate among Japanese faces, hits and ConFAs were virtually equal (dЈ ϭ 0.03). Among the G2FA and IncFA rates, we observed no differences between Experiments 5 and 6. However, hit rates were 21% lower, F(1, 163) ϭ 223.8, MSE ϭ 2.48, p 2 ϭ .58, and ConFA rates were 41% higher, F(1, 163) ϭ 866.2, MSE ϭ 2.65, p 2 ϭ .84, in Experiment 6 relative to Experiment 5. In our view, the changes across Experiments 5 and 6 (and parallel changes in later experiments) greatly clarify the nature of heuristic processes in this face-recognition procedure. We return to this topic in the General Discussion. Experiment 7. In Experiment 7, we reduced the cue validity of race: Group 1 now included 14 Caucasian and 4 Japanese faces; Group 2 had the complementary composition. In prior systematic conditions (with perfect cue validity), the strict application of the resemblance heuristic would elicit nine ConFA errors but otherwise perfect performance. In Experiment 5, the average number of combined errors was 6.07, considerably better than blind application of resemblance. When the groups were reversed in Experiment 6, the average combined error rate was 13.7, considerably worse than resemblance alone. As we later discuss, these very different response patterns appear to have identical underlying sources: People combined generation and resemblance strategies, regardless of the changes in costs and benefits.
In the systematic conditions reported thus far, we manipulated LOP during study and within-versus cross-race identification during test. Both manipulations were intended to alter people's facility using generation-the specific recollection of faces and their original groups-which would lead to different reliance on resemblance. By changing cue validity in Experiment 7, we intended to reduce the utility of resemblance: With a 14/4 group composition, the resemblance heuristic could still benefit performance, but four more systematic errors would arise. The results, shown in Table 2 , are surprising: Participants completely abandoned the resemblance heuristic, creating a data pattern that was statistically indistinguishable from the random condition (Experiment 4). There were trends toward LOP effects (ranging from 1% to 4%) in all measures, although none was reliable. We thus collapsed across LOPs for all analyses (see Figure 3 , Panel D). As in Experiment 4, the mean G2FA rate (33%) was reliably higher than the averaged ConFA and IncFA rates (19%), F(1, 79) ϭ 41.6, MSE ϭ 1.70, p 2 ϭ .35. The ConFA and IncFA rates, in turn, did not differ from each other, F(1, 79) ϭ 1.5, ns. In a multivariate ANOVA, we compared the respective hit, G2FA, ConFA, and IncFA rates across Experiments 4 and 7. Three indices were statistically equivalent; only the 5% difference in ConFA rates was reliable, F(1, 149) ϭ 4.7, MSE ϭ 2.11, p Ͻ .05, p 2 ϭ .03. In Experiment 4 (with random photo groups), participants averaged 15.7 errors. In Experiment 7, even with imperfect cues to group membership, strict application of resemblance would yield 13 errors. Nevertheless, participants averaged 15.8 errors.
In Experiment 7, our expectation was that, with reduced cue validity, some participants would still use a resemblance strategy and others would rely only on generation. That is, we predicted a reemergence of subgroups. However, when examining the data from all 80 participants, we did not find a single person with a clear resemblance profile. Thus, although cue validity in Experiment 7 remained fairly high, predicting group membership with 78% accuracy, every participant treated the groups as if they were randomly assembled.
Experiment 8. In Experiment 8, we combined the manipulations of Experiments 6 and 7, presenting the predominantly Japanese photo set as Group 1, again with reduced (78%) cue validity. Although participants in Experiment 7 ignored the modest systematicity of such groups, we expected that, as in Experiment 6, forcing discrimination among Japanese faces would increase the difficulty of contextual generation. In turn, we expected participants to return to the resemblance strategy. As the results in Table  2 suggest, this generally occurred.
Once again, there were no reliable LOP effects; we therefore collapsed across LOPs for the remaining analyses. As shown in Figure 3 , Panel E, the responses followed a resemblance profile, with ConFA rates (46%) exceeding both G2FA rates (23%), F(1, 78) ϭ 28.0, MSE ϭ 1.18, p 2 ϭ .33, and IncFA rates (15%), F(1, 78) ϭ 40.6, MSE ϭ 1.15, p 2 ϭ .48. Nevertheless, the pattern was relatively weak, with higher G2FA and IncFA rates than we observed previously (e.g., Experiment 6). Indeed, the pattern resembled the systematic condition of Experiment 1, which reflected a combination of subgroups. We examined the response patterns of all 79 participants in Experiment 8: Nearly one third clearly used the resemblance heuristic (13 and 11 in the shallow and deep LOP conditions, respectively). Thus, by making generation more difficult, we successfully encouraged some participants back toward a resemblance strategy.
Experiment 9. Experiment 9 was nearly identical to Experiment 7, with a predominantly Caucasian photo set presented as Group 1. The only change was a slight increase in cue validity: Rather than 14 Caucasian and 4 Japanese faces, Group 1 now included 16 Caucasian and 2 Japanese faces. Group 2 had a complementary structure. In Experiment 7, despite 78% cue validity, no participants availed themselves of the cue validity's potentially useful information. In Experiment 9, with 89% cue validity, we expected more participants to use resemblance, perhaps with overall results similar to those of Experiment 8. The only difference was that, in Experiment 8, we increased the difficulty of generation. In Experiment 9, we increased the utility of resemblance.
Once again, LOP effects were absent; we collapsed over LOPs for all analyses. As shown in Table 2 (and Figure 3 , Panel F), overall response patterns conformed to a resemblance profile. Although mean G2FA (18%) and ConFA (21%) rates were statistically equivalent, F(1, 79) ϭ 1.9, ns, the ConFA rate exceeded the IncFA rate (10%), F(1, 78) ϭ 23.5, MSE ϭ 1.08, p 2 ϭ .19. One can best appreciate the overall change in response patterns by comparing Experiment 9 with Experiment 7 (Figure 3 , Panels D and F): With a small increase in cue validity, hit rates increased by 10% in Experiment 9, F(1, 158) ϭ 17.7, MSE ϭ 2.77, p 2 ϭ .16; G2FA rates decreased by 15%, F(1, 158) ϭ 29.0, MSE ϭ 2.69, p 2 ϭ .25; and IncFA rates decreased by 7%, F(1, 158) ϭ 8.5, MSE ϭ 2.67, p 2 ϭ .09. Finally, recall that in Experiment 7, no participants (out of 80) showed obvious use of resemblance. By contrast, 34 of 80 participants in Experiment 9 had clear resemblance response patterns (18 and 16 in the shallow and deep LOP conditions, respectively). As we expected, by making resemblance more useful, we again increased its prevalence.
Experiment 10. Although many participants in Experiment 9 responded in accordance with the resemblance heuristic, it was certainly not a uniform strategy. Instead, subgroups again emerged, with some people using resemblance and others generation (or some combination thereof). By way of contrast, we note that participants in Experiment 5 (with 100% cue validity) showed a stronger resemblance profile at the group level, with 9% more hits, 13% fewer G2FAs, and 8% fewer IncFAs (all ps Ͻ .01). In addition, whereas 81 of 87 participants in Experiment 5 showed a clear resemblance pattern, only 34 of 80 participants in Experiment 9 followed suit. In Experiment 10, we again used the 16/2 group composition (89% cue validity), but with the previous role reversal, with the predominantly Japanese photo set as Group 1. With this change, the generation strategy should be harder, and more people may turn to the resemblance heuristic.
Recall that, in Experiment 6 (with 100% cue validity and reversed groups), a very strong resemblance profile emerged, with G2FA and IncFA rates below 7% and IncFA rates above 57%. As shown in the final two rows of (Figure 3 , Panel C), there were no reliable differences: At the group level, people in both experiments behaved identically. Finally, we again examined individual response profiles: In Experiment 6, we found 76 (of 78) participants with a clear resemblance profile. In Experiment 10, we observed virtually the same breakdown, with 74 of 78 participants showing the resemblance pattern. Thus, when cue validity was reasonably high and discriminations were difficult, nearly all participants switched back to the resemblance heuristic.
Experiments 11 and 12: Enhancing Generation
Across Experiments 4 -10, response patterns suggested that participants used the resemblance strategy, as indicated by reduced G2FAs and increased ConFAs, but only under certain conditions. Given conditions with more difficult discriminations (Experiments 6, 8, and 10), resemblance use appeared more prevalent, at least with respect to ConFA rates. When resemblance cue validity was reduced and Caucasian faces were presented first (Experiments 7 and 9), people were less likely to follow the resemblance strategy, apparently relying on generation. Although these results are or-derly and consistent with our predictions, none of the preceding experiments has directly addressed the generation heuristic. Instead, we have made resemblance more or less viable across experiments, with generation remaining as the fallback option. In Experiments 11 and 12, we conducted partial replications of prior experiments, with new conditions intended to make generation easier and therefore a more attractive strategy.
Experiment 11 had four conditions: Two constituted a direct replication of Experiment 4, with random groups (half Caucasian, half Asian) and the same shallow and deep encoding tasks. We naturally expected the results to mirror those of Experiment 4. The remaining two conditions were nearly identical, but we attempted to enhance the group-identity cues that are required for successful generation of prior context. In particular, we added thick borders to the Group 1 and Group 2 photographs for the learning phase, with white borders for Group 1 and red borders for Group 2. No borders were shown during recognition tests. Thus, if participants could recall which border (if any) went with a face, they could recover prior context. In previous random conditions, the only cues to group membership were temporal. We expected the borders to improve generation, leading to better overall performance. We also anticipated that, with better generation, people might benefit from deeper encoding, unlike the participants in Experiment 4. In itself, improved performance would not necessarily reflect the generation heuristic, which relates the ease of contextual generation to one's feeling of successful memory. Although such feelings are difficult to measure, we collected confidence ratings after recognition judgments, seeking an indirect measure.
Method: Experiment 11
Participants. The participants were 160 introductory psychology students at Arizona State University, with 40 students per condition.
Materials. Experiment 11 used the same photos (Ekman & Matsumoto, 1993 ) that were used in Experiments 4 -10. The only change was that, during Group 1 encoding, each photo was shown with a thick, bright white border. The border increased the total image size by approximately 30%. During Group 2 encoding, the border was bright red. No borders were shown in the recognition test.
Design. Experiment 11 had a 2 ϫ 2 between-subjects design, with two LOPs (shallow, deep) crossed with two encoding conditions (no borders, borders). As in Experiment 4, 18 photos were studied in Group 1, followed by 18 in Group 2. Each group was evenly divided between Asian and Caucasian faces. In the recognition test, all 36 photos were presented, with 18 new photos (half Asian, half Caucasian). As before, participants were required to respond old to Group 1 photos and new to all others.
Procedure. Most procedures followed those of Experiments 4 -10, with one change: After each recognition judgment was entered, the computer presented a 1-9 scale for confidence ratings. The values ranged from no confidence (1) to very confident (9), with somewhat confident (5) in the central position. Participants entered their ratings via mouse click.
Results and Discussion: Experiment 11
The recognition results for Experiment 11 are shown in the upper panels of Figure 4 ; the confidence ratings are shown in the upper half of Table 3 . Again, the labels ConFA and IncFA do not logically apply to Experiment 11 but are used for consistency. In both upper panels of Figure 4 , the gray bars represent conditions without enhanced encoding cues (i.e., conditions that replicated Experiment 4). These results were very similar to Experiment 4:
We observed no LOP effects in hits or any false alarm rates, all Fs(1, 79) Ͻ 2.0, ns. When we collapsed across LOPs, the G2FA rate exceeded the averaged ConFA and IncFA rates by 14.6%, F(1, 79) ϭ 70.1, MSE ϭ 2.60, p 2 ϭ .51. The ConFA and IncFA rates did not differ from each other, F(1, 79) ϭ 0.8, ns. Contrary to actual performance, the confidence data did show LOP effects, with higher confidence following deeper encoding, F(1, 79) ϭ 13.8, MSE ϭ 0.43, p 2 ϭ .19, including trials producing both hits and false alarms. As one would expect, people were more confident on hit trials than false alarm trials, F(1, 79) ϭ 140.7, MSE ϭ 0.61, p 2 ϭ .48. They were also more confident when classifying Caucasian faces, F(1, 79) ϭ 188.9, MSE ϭ 0.49, p 2 ϭ .71. People expressed less confidence when committing G2FA errors than ConFA or IncFA errors, but these trends were not reliable.
The black bars in the upper panels of Figure 4 show the conditions with enhanced generation cues. When we compare these with the gray bars, several findings are immediately apparent. When collapsed across LOPs, recognition performance was superior when photos were encoded with group-specific borders: Hits increased by an average of 18.3%, F (1, 159) 2 ϭ .38. Consistent with expectations, recognition performance was improved by the addition of photographic borders during encoding. These borders were not shown during test, so they could only have functioned as context retrieval cues, helping participants recall the original group memberships for different faces. Relative to the condition without borders, hits increased and all false alarms decreased when context-generation cues were enhanced. The qualitative patterns were similar across conditions, with G2FAs exceeding true false alarms, as anticipated with randomly assembled groups. Given the added borders, however, we observed reliable LOP effects. Perhaps most interesting, confidence ratings provided some indication of the generation heuristic, as described by Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) . In particular, when people were provided with enhanced generation cues, they expressed greater confidence in their memory decisions, even when committing false alarms. Presumably, as some trials provided easy generation, enhanced confidence generalized across all trials. In short, by adding distinctive, photo-group-specific cues, we successfully increased contextual retrieval and apparently created a sense of generally better memory. Having verified this method for improving generation, we used it in Experiment 12.
Similar to Experiments 4 -10, Experiment 12 was intended to encourage different groups of participants to adopt either the generation or the resemblance strategy. In earlier experiments, however, we varied the utility of resemblance without manipulating the ease of generation. In Experiment 12, we crossed two levels of resemblance (cue validity) with two levels of generation (photograph borders). Two conditions of Experiment 12 were replications of earlier experimental conditions-that is, the deepencoding conditions of Experiments 8 and 10. Recall that Experiment 8 used relatively low (78%) cue validity, with Japanese faces predominant in Group 1, which produced relatively weak reliance on resemblance (approximately one third of participants). Experiment 10 used a higher cue validity (89%), again with Japanese faces predominant in Group 1, leading to nearly unanimous resemblance use. (When we previously used similar cue validity values with Caucasian faces presented first, we found no resemblance use in Experiment 7 and weak resemblance use in Experiment 9. We chose the Japanese-first procedure for Experiment 12 to maximize the likely range of outcomes.) Although these two conditions of Experiment 12 directly replicated earlier conditions, we now collected confidence ratings, which allowed comparison with two new conditions. The novel conditions of Experiment 12 introduced the photographic borders, which should improve contextual generation. If so, we expect systematic movement away from resemblance use.
Method: Experiment 12
Participants. Participants were 160 students at Arizona State University, with 40 per condition.
Materials. Experiment 12 used the same photographs as in Experiment 11, including versions of each face with and without borders.
Design. Experiment 12 had a 2 ϫ 2 between-subjects design, with two levels of cue validity (78%, 89%) crossed with two encoding conditions (no borders, borders). In all conditions, Group 1 predominantly consisted of Asian faces.
Procedure. Procedures were identical to the deep-encoding conditions of Experiment 11. 
Results and Discussion: Experiment 12
Seventy-eight percent cue validity. The recognition results for Experiment 12 are shown in the lower panels of Figure 4 ; confidence ratings are shown in the lower half of Table 3. In the condition with 78% cue validity (Panel C), the recognition results were similar to those of Experiment 8, with mixed application of the resemblance strategy. With no photographic borders during encoding (gray bars), responses generally followed a resemblance profile, with ConFA rates (43%) exceeding both G2FA rates (24%), F(1, 39) ϭ 53.1, MSE ϭ 1.79, p 2 ϭ .31, and IncFA rates (15%), F(1, 39) ϭ 75.2, MSE ϭ 1.89, p 2 ϭ .40. Nevertheless, the pattern was relatively weak (e.g., in contrast to Experiment 6). We again examined individual response patterns, finding that 17 (of 40) participants clearly used resemblance, a proportion similar to that observed in Experiment 8. The confidence data suggest that participants found this a difficult task: Although confidence was higher to hits than to false alarms, F(1, 39) ϭ 19.6, MSE ϭ 0.31, p 2 ϭ .19, all confidence ratings were rather low. The black bars show results for conditions with photo borders shown during encoding; the borders produced clear qualitative changes in performance, with no apparent use of a resemblance strategy. G2FA errors (32%) exceeded the averaged ConFA and IncFA errors (17%), F(1, 39) ϭ 31.1, MSE ϭ 1.66, p 2 ϭ .24. The ConFA and IncFA rates did not reliably differ. On an individual level, only 2 (of 40) participants clearly used the resemblance strategy.
Within the 78% cue validity condition, we compared recognition and confidence data across the conditions with and without borders. When we added borders during encoding, hit rates increased by 13%, F(1, 79) ϭ 28.7, MSE ϭ 2.05, p 2 ϭ .18; G2FA rates increased by 8%, F(1, 79) ϭ 11.5, MSE ϭ 1.99, p 2 ϭ .10; and ConFA rates decreased by 25%, F(1, 79) ϭ 58.5, MSE ϭ 2.17, p 2 ϭ .37. IncFA rates were equivalent. These data suggest that participants generally performed better when they could use generation rather than resemblance: Although G2FA errors slightly increased, these were more than offset by increased hits and decreased ConFA errors. (Note, however, that participants using resemblance in the condition without borders averaged 85.5% hits.) In the confidence data (see Table 3 ), we observed a general increase in the condition with borders, F(1, 79) ϭ 102.8, MSE ϭ 0.22, p 2 ϭ .61. Given better generation cues, participants felt confident about their performance, even when committing false alarms. Taken together, the 78% cue validity results show a moderate tendency for people to use resemblance when photo borders were absent during encoding. However, when the borders were provided, we observed a nearly complete shift toward generation. This strategic change was accompanied by increased confidence, even when such confidence was unwarranted.
Eighty-nine percent cue validity. Figure 4 , Panel D, shows results from the conditions with 89% cue validity. In the condition without photograph borders during encoding (gray bars), the recognition and confidence data combine to extend our earlier observations. The recognition data closely replicate the deep-encoding condition of Experiment 10 (see Table 2 ), showing a strong resemblance profile: ConFA rates (79%) greatly exceeded both G2FA rates (5%), F(1, 39) ϭ 221.6, MSE ϭ 1.46, p 2 ϭ .62, and IncFA rates (4%), F(1, 39) ϭ 225.9, MSE ϭ 1.47, p 2 ϭ .64. When we examined individual profiles, we found that 36 of 40 participants clearly used resemblance. When we contrasted these results with the 78% cue validity, no-border condition (gray bars in Figure 4 , Panel C), reliable differences emerged for all four indices: Higher hit and ConFA rates occurred with higher cue validity, both Fs(1, 79) Ͼ 30.0, along with lower G2FA and IncFA rates, both Fs(1, 79) Ͼ 20.0.
Unlike prior conditions, the confidence data in the 89%/noborder condition also provided a clear impression of the resemblance strategy. Participants expressed moderate and equivalent confidence when producing hits and ConFA errors. This seems to verify the strategy suggested by the accuracy data-participants called nearly all Asian faces old, realizing that mistakes were inevitable. By contrast, old responses to Caucasian faces must have occurred only when participants felt quite certain. The average confidence to G2FA and IncFA trials (8.35) greatly exceeded the average confidence to hit and ConFA trials (5.15), F(1, 39) ϭ 189.2, MSE ϭ 0.59, p 2 ϭ .58. In a post hoc analysis, it also appeared that old responses to Caucasian faces were made with Note. Consistent and inconsistent do not logically apply to Experiment 11. These are better considered as false alarm (Caucasian) and false alarm (Japanese). G2FA ϭ Group 2 false alarm; ConFA ϭ consistent false alarm; IncFA ϭ inconsistent false alarm; LOP ϭ level of processing.
greater confidence (7.79), relative to Japanese faces (5.21). However, more than half (23) of the participants simply never classified any Caucasian faces as old, which makes statistical inference unreasonable.
In the condition with photograph borders shown during encoding (black bars), the recognition data suggest a clear reduction in the resemblance strategy, relative to the no-borders condition. The signature profile still emerged, with ConFA rates (30%) exceeding both G2FA rates (20%), F(1, 39) ϭ 18.3, MSE ϭ 2.02, p 2 ϭ .12, and IncFA rates (21%), F(1, 39) ϭ 17.9, MSE ϭ 1.95, p 2 ϭ .11. However, these differences were far smaller than the corresponding differences in the no-borders condition-both two-way interactions, F(1, 79) Ͼ 60.0. The individual performance profiles showed a near-perfect split between people who favored a resemblance strategy (19) and people who showed no clear strategy (21). This bimodal distribution seems to explain the confidence ratings, which were uniformly high, with little variation across hits and all three categories of false alarms. When participants used resemblance, they gave high confidence ratings to G2FA and IncFA errors (as in the no-borders condition), with low confidence to hits and ConFA errors. When participants apparently relied on generation, they were confident on hit trials, with lesser confidence to all false alarms. Comparisons across the conditions with 89% cue validity revealed reliable differences in every measure, all Fs(1, 79) Ͼ 20.0, except for confidence to G2FA errors.
One can appreciate the essential results of Experiments 11 and 12 by comparing the deep LOP condition of Experiment 11 (Figure 4 , Panel B) with both conditions of Experiment 12 (lower panels). Recall that Experiment 12 only used the deep-encoding procedure, which makes these three panels most comparable with one another. Moving across panels, one can clearly see the emerging reliance on resemblance, conditionalized by the allure of generation: In Experiment 11 (with random photo groups), resemblance was not a viable strategy. There were, however, clear improvements in performance, on the basis of the added borders during study. In Panel C (Experiment 12, 78% cue validity), the no-border group used resemblance to a degree, as shown by the rise-fall profile of the gray bars. By contrast, participants who saw borders during encoding showed no hint of resemblance use. In Panel D (Experiment 12, 89% cue validity), resemblance use among the no-border group was very strong. In addition, with the increased validity of racial cues, the group who received borders during learning also began to apply a resemblance strategy, albeit to a lesser degree. Thus, different groups of participants elegantly struck a balance between resemblance and generation, trading one approach for the other to degrees inspired by the prevailing statistics.
Taken together, the results of Experiment 12 further suggest that face recognition strategies are highly sensitive to prevailing statistical and retrieval cues. In conditions without enhanced encoding cues, participants typically followed the resemblance strategy, with stronger adherence when racial features (Asian, Caucasian) better predicted group membership. This pattern replicates our earlier observations and was generally reinforced by the confidence data. Of greater interest are the conditions with enhanced encoding cues. In prior experiments with Caucasian faces in Group 1 (Experiments 4, 5, 7, and 9), people could easily reject Japanese faces as new, thus minimizing G2FA and IncFA errors. Hit and ConFA rates would then reflect their ability to discriminate old from new Caucasian faces-a combination of resemblance and relatively easy discrimination. By reversing the assignment of faces to Groups 1 and 2, we intentionally made discrimination more difficult. In Experiment 12, we attempted to offset that difficulty. Once people were provided cues to improve recollection of face-group assignments, many eschewed the resemblance strategy. In the condition with 89% cue validity, this return to generation actually reduced overall performance, only improving ConFA rates. Nevertheless, confidence mostly improved (e.g., to hits), apparently reflecting participants' comfort using "real" memory to make decisions.
General Discussion Whittlesea and Leboe (2000; Leboe & Whittlesea, 2002) noted that remembering is always inferential, even when a person really feels he or she has retrieved a pristine record of the past. As in other probabilistic decisions (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) , memory decisions entail various unconscious heuristics that affect subjective feelings of memory. On the basis of SCAPE, Whittlesea and Leboe suggested that experiences of memory arise from a two-stage process. First is production of mental states, wherein images or ideas are brought to mind. Production may occur with obvious perceptual input, such as a letter string or face. In perceptual recognition, the mind elaborates on the stimulus (Neisser, 1967) , perhaps endowing a face with the person's name and other attributes. Alternatively, production may arise from recall, with only covert retrieval cues (Tulving & Thompson, 1973) .
Production creates the informational content of cognition (e.g., perception, recognition, recall). Following production, the second stage in SCAPE is evaluation. This is not direct evaluation of the stimulus, such as deciding whether a recognition target exceeds a response criterion. Instead, Whittlesea (1997) suggested that people automatically and continuously evaluate their own production efficiency, keeping a running index of the relative harmony of mind (for similar views, see Gilbert, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2000) . By its nature, evaluation is dynamic, creating different subjective states of mind. For example, imagine entering your home after work. Perceptual (production) processes will fluently recognize familiar objects and their locations. The evaluation process will not be unduly aroused, creating no particular feelings of any kind. Alternatively, perhaps on entering you experience a momentary, weird feeling (i.e., processing dysfluency). You soon realize that the maid service had come that day, moving things while cleaning. A moment of apprehension ("Is someone here?") quickly converts to pleasure ("Wow, they really did a thorough job!"), on the basis of successive evaluations of a momentary processing hitch.
In SCAPE, production does the primary work of memory; evaluation supports subjective feelings. Given its inferential nature, evaluation involves heuristic processes, which let it quickly attribute processing changes to various sources. Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) emphasized that such heuristics are robustly accurate, reflecting correlations in the world (i.e., natural cue validity; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Kahneman, 2003) . However, they can also elicit systematic errors, such as memory illusions. In recognition, a familiar example is the fluency effect (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Whittlesea et al., 1990) . Perceptual processes typically improve when stimuli are experienced and later repeated (repetition priming). In memory tests, people tacitly presume a relation of fluency and prior experience. When researchers extrinsically manipulate fluency, as in subliminal priming (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989) , participants often experience heightened familiarity. Kleider and Goldinger (2004) studied perceptual fluency in face memory, finding two-way illusions. In recognition, people experienced undue familiarity for perceptually enhanced photos. In tests of subjective perceptual quality, people experienced higher clarity and longer exposure durations for familiar photos (see Whittlesea et al., 1990; Witherspoon & Allan, 1985) .
Given the proposed interdependence of production and evaluation, the fluency heuristic has an intuitive basis. In this investigation, we tested two other heuristics described by Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) , both having the same underlying origin as the fluency heuristic. The generation heuristic is a retrieval-based version of the fluency heuristic. Often, a vague sense of familiarity can be converted to a strong feeling of memory, on the basis of the successful retrieval of prior context (e.g., the actor example in the introduction). According to SCAPE, context retrieval is a production process that occurs with variable speed and coherence. The evaluation process is attuned to such variation, creating feelings ranging from nonmemory to confidence. As with perceptual fluency, the generation heuristic is robustly accurate: In most cases, rapid retrieval of prior context likely signals true memory. However, situations must arise wherein contexts are inappropriately available (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) , leading to undue confidence in recall. One such situation may be eyewitness identification, as relevant contexts are often foremost in mind. Whereas the fluency and generation heuristics respectively address the perception and retrieval aspects of production, the resemblance heuristic addresses the middle ground. By this heuristic, a stimulus-either presented or retrieved-creates a feeling of memory if it matches the general theme of prior episodes. An obvious example is false memory following exposure to thematically arranged words or faces (Homa et al., 2001; Roediger & McDermott, 1995 . Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) suggested that resemblance is related to generation, differing mainly in specificity: In generation, people produce specific prior contexts for each stimulus. In resemblance, they produce general themes. Whittlesea and Leboe also noted, appropriately in our view, that these are rarely clear distinctions. In the Roediger and McDermott (1995) example, false recognition of SLEEP may reflect either heuristic or a combination of both. That is, people may easily generate context for the recent appearance of SLEEP (generation), largely because it fits the general theme of that context (resemblance). Perceptual fluency may also affect recognition decisions for SLEEP, as its perception may be enhanced by associative priming. As Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) noted, memory decisions may reflect isolated heuristics or heuristics operating in tandem.
The Present Results
The present investigation is an attempt to assess the generation and resemblance heuristics in face recognition, complementing our recent study of the fluency heuristic (Kleider & Goldinger, 2004) . Given their similar bases, it is challenging (perhaps impossible) to identify the unique contributions of generation and resemblance to memory performance. Our experimental strategy therefore focused on manipulating the likely influence of each heuristic across experiments. In Experiments 1-3, which contrasted white and stucco backgrounds, half the participants experienced randomly structured groups, with no basis for a resemblance strategy. In this condition, people likely evaluated the familiarity of each photo (allowing rejection of new foils), trying to retrieve group contexts for familiar faces (allowing rejection of Group 2 foils). Participants performed this source-memory task better than chance but not particularly well.
In contrast to the random conditions, systematic conditions allowed a resemblance strategy, as Group 1 and Group 2 photos were distinguishable by backgrounds. In all three experiments, participants in systematic conditions produced response profiles consistent with resemblance: Hits and ConFA errors increased, whereas G2FA and IncFA errors decreased. Thus, Experiments 1-3 show that, given the opportunity, people often favor the heuristic resemblance strategy over the more vigilant generation strategy. However, other results are less interpretable. First, in each systematic condition, we found subgroups: Some people used resemblance, and others behaved as if the groups were random. Given the relative subtlety of our background cues, we wondered whether some participants simply failed to notice their systematic nature. Second, across Experiments 1-3, we manipulated the LOP of face encoding. We expected that, given stronger memory traces of photos, people would be less willing to relinquish control to the resemblance heuristic. However, the LOP results were mixed, as deeper LOPs conveyed simultaneous benefits and costs. This was shown most clearly by the random conditions: As encoding LOP grew deeper, hit rates modestly increased, and false alarms to new photos modestly decreased. However, G2FA errors also increased-with deeper study, Group 2 faces also became more familiar, which made them harder to reject. LOP effects were absent in the systematic conditions, perhaps reflecting the subgroup differences.
In Experiments 4 -12, we changed stimuli, contrasting Caucasian and Japanese faces. As in the prior experiments, our strategy was to first contrast conditions that either precluded or strongly encouraged the resemblance heuristic. Once those endpoint conditions were recorded, we explored the middle ground, seeking to nudge different groups of people back and forth between heuristics. With respect to generation, we attempted to increase its prevalence by requiring deeper LOPs during encoding, again to little avail. 4 We achieved greater success, however, by reversing 3 Similar cases may arise in depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and other conditions that are characterized by intrusive memories or prevailing moods. For example, trauma victims often experience exaggerated threat in stimuli (Ehlers, Margraf, Davies, & Roth, 1988; Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McCarthy, 1991; McNally, Riemann, & Kim, 1990; Zeitlin & McNally, 1991) , and depressed individuals tend to remember events more negatively than they were originally experienced (Gotlib & Cane, 1987) . Such subjective states may reflect learned patterns in the production process, using highly available contexts for inappropriate stimuli. 4 One point of potential concern was the general lack of LOP effects. In Experiments 4 -10, we manipulated LOP, contrasting passive viewing with attractiveness rating. With a few marginal exceptions, the LOP manipulation was ineffective, raising at least two possibilities: First, our tasks may the assignments of faces to Groups 1 and 2. With Caucasian faces presented first, participants could use resemblance to easily reject all Japanese faces, then use some combination of recollection and familiarity to discriminate old and new Caucasian faces (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) . With Japanese faces presented first, within-race discrimination should have been more difficult (Byatt & Rhodes, 2004) . In these cases, people tended to rely more completely on resemblance. In Experiments 11 and 12, we added an extrinsic manipulation, with distinctive borders added to photos during encoding. During test, if any face evoked recollection of its border, the participant would simultaneously know that the photo was old and its original group. With these new cues, many people moved back toward generation, even in the reverse-order conditions of Experiment 12.
With respect to resemblance, we manipulated cue validity, with interesting results. With entirely systematic groups, it was not surprising that people used resemblance, correctly rejecting inconsistent photos at impressive rates. When cue validity was first reduced to 78% (Experiment 7), an unexpected result emerged: Every single participant (N ϭ 80) seemingly abandoned the resemblance heuristic, relying instead on brute force memory. At this point, we can suggest two potential explanations. First, participants might have appreciated the group structures but decided that eight extra systematic errors were unacceptable, which would have precluded a resemblance strategy. Although this is possible, it implies a previously unsuspected streak of perfectionism in our students. Second, by reducing cue validity by 22%, we might have disrupted participants' ability to track the remaining systematicity. Although this seems likely, results from Experiment 8 suggest otherwise: With groups reversed, one third of participants returned to a resemblance approach. These patterns were enhanced in Experiments 9 and 10, wherein cue validity was marginally increased to 89%. Finally, in Experiments 11 and 12, we extrinsically enhanced generation cues, with easily anticipated results.
By combining manipulations of cue validity and group discriminability, we induced a pattern of trade-offs (at the group level), with different heuristics assuming priority in different conditions. However, the data also suggest that participants readily combined heuristics, sometimes to their benefit and sometimes to their detriment. People apparently followed either of two potential strategies. They either (a) used resemblance to quickly reject some photos, using generation for the rest, or (b) used generation whenever possible, applying resemblance as a backup option. (Our data cannot discriminate these potential approaches, which we intend to investigate further.) In some cases, such as Experiment 5, this combined approach led to excellent performance, considerably better than could be achieved by resemblance alone. In other cases, such as Experiments 6 and 12, it led to worse performance than pure resemblance would have produced.
We believe this pattern is instructive, especially with respect to the generation heuristic. In these experiments, the resemblance strategy created a signature pattern, making it easy to detect. Generation, however, is more difficult empirically and conceptually. Although Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) provided a clear description, the generation heuristic remains slippery. Consider an eyewitness viewing a lineup: By reasonable standards, generation represents ideal behavior. Seeing a familiar face, the witness tries to verify that familiarity originates from the proper context. Within the limits of fallible human performance, this seems nearly algorithmic. However, such contextual generation also elicits the generation heuristic, as the efficiency of generation itself becomes a memory cue (Stanovich & West, 2000) .
From the perspective of SCAPE, the question is a matter of degree: All memory decisions, correct and incorrect, entail production and evaluation. However, the impact of evaluation waxes and wanes, depending on changes in production. Considering the fluency heuristic, Whittlesea and Williams (2001a, 2001b) noted that absolute perceptual fluency has little bearing on behavior; what matter are changes in fluency, relative to expectations. If this logic applies to generation, some memory decisions will be more heuristic than others. This raises a research question: Can we tell when memory decisions rely more heavily on evaluation? Whereas studies of perceptual fluency allow direct stimulus control, generation fluency is less tangible. In the present research, we adopted a global strategy, manipulating the fluency of generation (between subjects) for entire test sessions. In Experiment 6, expectations of fluency should have been modest, encouraging a strong resemblance strategy. Nevertheless, participants performed suboptimally, apparently trusting gut feelings of familiarity in some trials. Having piloted ourselves in these experiments, we can testify: Even when resemblance is the easier and smarter approach, strong feelings of familiarity or novelty are difficult to ignore. In future research, we will attempt to manipulate generation fluency within trials.
Conclusion: Heuristics in Face Recognition
An episode of The Practice (D. E. Kelley, Moreno, & Brown, 2000) included a scene with an unlikely courtroom stunt. In a shoplifting case, a store security guard is called to testify. The prosecutor gestures toward a woman at the defense table, seeking verification of identity: "You saw this woman?" The guard agrees. In fact, she is wearing the same red dress today. Shortly thereafter, the defense attorney cross-examines and repeatedly asks, "You're positive this is the woman you saw?" The witness is unwavering. Finally, the attorney calls out, "Will the real Emma Lugar please stand up?" In the gallery, the actual defendant stands up, a woman, wearing a blue dress, who resembles the identified confederate. The guard looks shocked, the judge annoyed.
Entertainment value aside, this scene provides insight into the generation and resemblance heuristics. Although similarity between the women was relatively modest, the confederate wore the same dress as the original shoplifter. Moreover, all aspects of the situation encouraged rapid acceptance of the implied prior context. With such strongly biased generation, any appreciable resemblance between the confederate and the memory would encourage not sufficiently differ in LOP, creating a classic null effect. Second, the exclusion (source-memory) procedure may inhibit the effect: Group 1 targets and Group 2 foils are all enhanced by the deeper LOP, creating no net effect. To assess this, we conducted another experiment: Using the same photos and encoding tasks, we examined simple recognition, with no exclusion task. People studied 26 faces, followed by a recognition test (26 old, 26 foils). In the shallow condition (n ϭ 20), hit and false alarm rates were 81% and 16%, respectively. In the deep condition (n ϭ 21), these rates were 95% and 3%, respectively. Thus, without an exclusion requirement, we observed robust LOP effects. false recognition. We suggest that, in many cases, heuristics offset one another. For example, seeing a familiar-looking person (high fluency) without recalling prior context (low generation) leads to a reasonable interpretation: "You remind me of someone, but I'm not sure who." In similar fashion, having a prior context prominently in one's mind (high generation) does not elicit false recognition of people bearing little resemblance to the originally encoded person.
We return momentarily to The Practice. The judge, seeking to avoid a mistrial, recalls the security guard to the stand. Both women are now seated at the defense table. During the recess, however, they exchanged dresses. The judge asks the security guard, "Which woman did you see shoplifting?" The guard again selects the confederate rather than the defendant. He is confident, however, because he knows the real Emma Lugar was wearing the blue dress 15 min ago. This situation is structurally similar to our source-memory experiments (see Lindsay, 1994) : When context generation cues become unreliable, the witness defaults to a resemblance strategy-the woman in blue best fits the last encoding opportunity. In our study, the same strategy emerged, on the basis of photographic backgrounds or races. In all cases, face recognition was guided by different heuristics as cue validities changed.
Thinking in terms of heuristic trade-offs may provide insight into other face memory results. One example is unconscious transference in eyewitness memory (Loftus, 1976) , wherein a person, familiar from one context, is mistakenly associated with another. Houts (1956) described the case of a railroad ticket agent who misidentified a familiar customer as a robber (see Thompson, 1988) . In experimental settings, transference errors may result from exposure to mug shots (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Dysart, Lindsay, Hammond, & Dupuis, 2001) or from confusion between people witnessed in a common context, such as a criminal and a bystander (Geiselman, Haghighi, & Stown, 1996; Geiselman, MacArthur, & Meerovitch, 1993; Kleider & Goldinger, 2001; Ross, Ceci, Dunning, & Toglia, 1994) . From the heuristic perspective, transference has a natural explanation: Depending on experimental details, transference may reflect resemblance, unchecked by retrieval of context. Alternatively, it may reflect fluent retrieval of context, unchecked by weak resemblance.
Perhaps more important, when we consider generation and resemblance in tandem, we may explain the hidden side of transference. Specifically, the effect is hard to find. In the literature, transference effects are ephemeral, hinging on the similarity between individuals and the focus of attention during encoding (Kleider & Goldinger, 2001; Read, Tollestrup, Hammersley, McFadzen, & Christensen, 1990) . Imagine that memory decisions were based on whichever heuristic generated a signal first, as in a horse race: Resemblance between people would nearly always elicit false recognition, regardless of original encoding contexts. Alternatively, people known from the same context would be confusable, regardless of physical dissimilarity. Even in emotional situations, such as the basketball riot example from the introduction, such irrational memory errors are obviously rare. We suggest that transference requires a precise balance: Memory for the supposed perpetrator must be strong enough for resemblance errors to occur but also weak enough for resemblance errors to occur. Memory for the supposed bystander must be strong enough for prior context of his or her encoding to be retrieved but weak enough for his or her specific actions to be forgotten. An appreciation of memory heuristics may provide insight into transference and other aspects of face recognition and eyewitness memory.
